Bayesian Networks (BN) provide robust probabilistic methods of reasoning under un certainty, but despite their formal grounds are strictly based on the notion of condi tional dependence, not much attention has been paid so far to their use in dependability analysis. The aim of this paper is to pro pose BN as a suitable tool for dependability analysis, by challenging the formalism with basic issues arising in dependability tasks.
Introduction
Dependability analysis involves a set of methodologies dealing with the reliability aspects of large, safety critical systems [9, 10] . Two main categories of ap proaches can be identified: combinatorial methods and state-space based methods. The first category requires a description of the system to be analyzed in terms of components and their interactions. In particular, com ponents are modeled as binary events corresponding to component up and component down respectively, while interactions are usually described by means of boolean AND/OR gates. The advantage of such techniques is that they are component-oriented and that simple for malisms like Fault Trees (FT) can be adopted. How ever, some major simplificative assumptions are usu ally needed, both at the modeling and analysis level.
On the contrary, state-space approaches rely on the specification of the whole set of possible states of the system and on the modeling of the possible transi tions among them. Markov Chain methods are usu ally adopted in this case, giving the analyst the pos sibility of explicitly considering all possible interac tions among components. The main disadvantage is that, even for not very large systems, using directly the approach may be unfeasable due to the huge di mensionality of the considered state-space. The usual solutions is then to resort to partial state descriptions like Petri Nets [11] or Bayesian Networks based mod els [5 ] . However, state-space approaches are essen tially used when emphasis is on temporal evolution of the systems, while combinatorial methods concen trate more on static aspects as the logical interactions of the components1.
In this paper we aim at considering combinatorial methods for dependability analysis, by showing how basic problems addressed by the approach can be prof itably dealt with by using Bayesian Networks. In particular we will concentrate on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and on the modeling and analysis issues that are involved in this task. We will show that any FT can be mapped into a BN and that any analysis that can be performed on the FT can be performed by means of BN inference. in the tree, the probability of occurrence of the TE can also be calculated.
The qualitative analysis step is considered very im portant in dependability analysis and safety studies, since it allows the analyst to enumerate all the possi ble causes of failure for the system and to rank them according to a very simple severity measure given by the (prior) failure probabilities of components. How ever, because of the simplicity of the model, only prior failure probability can be considered and no kind of scenarios more specific than cut-sets can be computed.
The major weak point of the FTA methodology (as well as of any combinatorial technique), is the fact that the events must be considered as statistically indepen dent. The aim of the present paper is to show that, even by representing knowledge as in combinatorial models, alternative formalisms like Bayesian networks can be profitably adopted to overcome their limita tions. Let us now introduce some basic notions con cerning FTA:
Definition 1 A fault tree {FT) is a tree comprising five types of nodes: primary events, events, two types of elementary logical gates, namely AND gates and OR gates, and one derived logical gate, namely the k out of n gate k: n {see Figure 1 ).
The root of a FT is an event called the Top Event (TE), representing the failure of the whole system. Each event has exactly one successor which can be ei ther a primary event or a logical gate. A logical gate has two or more successors, which are all events; a k out of n gate has exactly n successor events. The leaves of the tree are all primary events. the input signal. Finally, the system is completed by a redundancy on the power supply system: two indepen dent power supply units ( P S1 and P S 2 ) are connected to other components, in such a way that the simulta neous failure of both P S units is needed to prevent the system to work.
The FT for this PLC system is reported in figure 3 . Notice that 2 : 3 gates are used to model the fault of the input part of each channel (since each CPU adopts a 2 : 3 majority voting) and the fault corre sponding to the fault of at least 2 channels (since the voter also uses a 2 : 3 majority voting). Notice also that sub-trees rooted at a given channel X are sim ilarly replicated for other channel different from X; indeed, notation ChA/B and ChA/C is used to indi cate that sub-trees rooted at Chn and Chc are equal to the sub-tree rooted at ChA with A substituted with B and C Concerning quantitative analysis, the most common assumption made in FTA is to assume that compo nents corresponding to primary events have an expo nentially distributed failure time. This means that the probability of having component C faulty at time t (alternatively the probability of occurrence of the primary event C = faulty) is P(C = faulty, t) = I -e->-ct, where >.c is the failure rate of component c.
Given the failure rates of each component, FTA can determine at any time instant t, the probability of oc currence of any event and in particular the probability of system failure (the TE) at timet. Moreover, the so called unreliability of MCS at timet can be computed.
This corresponds to the probability of the joint occur rence of events in the cut-set at timet; because of the independence assumption made on the occurrence of primary events, this corresponds to the product of the probability of occurrence of each primary event in the cut-set at time t 3 . In the system of figure 2, the fail ure rates (in terms of failure/hour) shown in ta ble 1 can be assumed by considering exponentially distributed failure time. Table 1 also shows the fail ure probability of components after 4 · 105 hours of system operation. FTA can then compute the prob ability of system failure at time t = 4 · 105 hours as P( TE ) :::: 0.22053. Similarly, the probability of any other event of the FT can be obtained. For example the probability of having a failure in the input part of a channel (P (Inx =faulty) = 0.03248, X= A, B, C)
or the probability of failure of at least two channels (P(Ch =faulty)= 0.18674).
Finally, MCS can be ranked in order of unreliability; table 2 shows the first 11 MC'S and in the second col umn (Unrel.) their corresponding unreliability. We can easily verify that the most critical components are the C' PUs, since the cut-sets involving a failure of at least two CPUs are those showing larger unreliability.
In the next sections we will show that, by using Bayesian networks, besides to perform the above anal yses we can augment both the modeling and the anal ysis power in dependability tasks. to represent all of them.
• for each pair (gate, output-event) of the FT, create a corresponding node in the BN;
• connects nodes in the BN as corresponding nodes are connected in the FT;
• for each node of the BN created from an AND (re spectively OR) gate, create a Conditional Proba bility Table ( CPT) such that the node is true with probability I iff all parent nodes are true (respec tively iff at least one parent node is true);
• for each node created from a k out of n gate, cre ate a CPT such that the node is true with prob ability 1 iff at least k out of n parent nodes are true.
Prior probabilities on root nodes have to be established by considering a given time point t. Given a root node C, the probability of C = true will be set to the proba bility of occurrence of the corresponding primary event at time t (i.e. P(C = faulty), t) = 1-e-> -ct). It should be clear that from the above conversion non root nodes of the BN are actually deterministic nodes, i.e. special chance (random) nodes with associated a deterministic function for their value determination (8] . Figure 4 shows the structure of the BN for the PLC system of figure 2 and derived from the FT of figure 3. Dependability Analysis with
Bayesian Networks
Typical FTA can be performed quite naturally in a BN setting. In particular, concerning MCS determination (i.e. qualitative analysis), because any deterministic node of the BN correspond to a boolean gate of the FT, any kind of technique adopted in FTA for com puting MCS can be applied also for the corresponding B l'f' . However, as we shall see in the following, the BN framework can refine the notion of cut-set when uncertainty about combinatorial knowledge has to be introduced (see section 5). Concerning quantitative analysis, a BN can in principle computes the posterior probability of any set of variables Q given the evidence set E (i.e. P(QIE )), so any kind of probabilistic com putation that can be performed in FTA can also be performed by BN inference. In particular the follow ing parameters can be computed at timet:
probability of occurrence of an event; it corre sponds to the computation of the prior marginal at time t on the node corresponding to the given event;
unreliability of MCS; it corresponds to the compu tation of the joint prior on nodes mentioned in the (6 ] . 5 More specific techniques relying on the "logical seman tics" of a EN in terms of Hom clauses (13, 14] can also be devised, by adopting abductive reasoning.
cut-set at time t6•
Concerning the first point, the marginals of all the fail ure events represented in the net can be computed by BN probability propagation [12] . However, standard BN inference usually deals with posterior probability computation, while the above issue are only related to prior information (i.e. to prediction of particular events at time t). In fact, by considering the occur rence of a failure, posterior information can be very relevant for dependability and reliability aspects. [3] . While in a log ical setting kernel diagnoses can be suitably adopted for concisely explain a system failure, in probabilistic analysis this is no longer true, since marginalization operations can provide counter-intuitive results [12] .
If we interpret each entry of the first column of table 2
as assigning the faulty mode to mentioned components and the working mode to unmentioned ones, we can interpret the MCS as diagnoses whose posterior prob ability if given in the last column of the table. Notice that, even if the top 11 diagnoses of our problem ac tually correspond to top 11 MCS in the same order of probability, this is not true in general, since diag noses corresponding to non-minimal cut-sets may have a larger probability than some diagnoses correspond ing to MCS. For instance, even if the PLC system has 59 MCS, the 18th (in order of probability) diagnosis is the one corresponding to all CPUs faulty and every 7Since MCS are prime implicants of the TE the condi tional probability of TE given a MCS is 1, so the posterior of a MCS given the TE differs from the prior only for the constant P( TE)-1• other component working (probability 0.00963) and this does not correspond to a MCS.
5

Au g mentin g Modelin g Power
There are essentially three main features of BN for malism that may be exploited to improve combina torial dependability analysis: noisy gates, multi-state variables and sequential failure dependence.
5.1
Noisy gates
Di�erently from fault-trees, in a BN dependency re latwns between events or variables are not restricted to be deterministic. In dependability terms, this cor responds to being able to model uncertainty in the behavior of the "gates" that in a FT represent inter actions between sub-systems. Of particular attention for reliability aspects is one peculiar modeling feature often used in building BN models: noisy gates. The most common kind of noisy gate is the noisy-or model [12] and its generalizations [7] ; this kind of model can be profitably used in dependability, since it allows a simple probabilistic generalization of boolean gates.
Consider, in the PLC case study, a situation in which more fault-tolerance is added to the system by means of a third spare power supplier that is available un der certain circumstances; in particular, it is shared by other systems and it is available only if it is not al ready in use. In this situation, it is no longer true that when both modeled suppliers are down, also the sys tem is certainly down, since the control system could switch to the spare supplier. Suppose that, from sta tistical information, we know that the spare supplier is available the 30% of time when the P S sub-system is down: we can model the uncertainty about the avail ability of the spare supplier by transforming the gate corresponding to the TE in a noisy-or gate with the following parameters (remember that TE= true means system failure):
c(TE = true/PS =working, Voter::= working ,Ch = working) = 0 c(TE = true/PS =faulty)= 0.7 c(TE =true/ Voter= faulty) = P(TE = true/Ch = faulty) = 1
As done in [2] we use c instead of P to emphasize the fact that these are not standard conditional proba bilities. The noisy-or independence assumption about causes of the TE is in this case reasonable and we could conclude that the system is down when only the PS sub-system is down with probability This is naturally treated in a BN by means of leak probabilities [15] . In the above example, we may have that the TE may be true even when both P S, Voter and C h sub-systems are functioning, because of a com mon cause problem; by assuming a leak probability Dually from noisy-or, we could also use a noisy-and gate to generalize AND gates of the FT. For instance, by considering the possibility of failure of wire con nections from power supply units, we can model the fact that, even if only one supplier is down, the P S sub-system is also down (because connections from the other supplier are not working). More specifi cally, if we assume that this event has a probability of 0.01, corresponding to the simultaneous independent failure of connections from both supplier.
5.2
Multi-state variables
The working/faulty dichotomy of FTA can be im proved towards the most reasonable approach of deal ing with variables having more than two values (multistate variables). This is particularly useful for primary events, since in this way the system component they refer to can be modeled by means of multiple behav ioral modes [4] . In fact, components may manifest more than one failure mode (e.g open/short) and the failure modes may have a very different effect on the system operation (e.g. fail-safe/fail-danger). Suppose to consider a three-state component whose states are identifi ed as working (w), fa il-open (f-o) and fa il-short (f-s). In FTA the component failure modes must be modeled as two independent binary events ( w/f-o) and (w/f-s); however, to make the model correct, a (non standard) XO R gate must be inserted between f-o and f-s since they are mutually exclusive events. On the contrary, Bayesian networks can include n-ary vari ables by adjusting the entries of the CPT. Saving in assessment provided by classical noisy-or in case of bi nary variables can now be obtained through general izations to n-ary variables, like for instance the noisy max gate [15] . In the next subsection we will return more specifi cally on this point.
5.3
Sequentially Dependent Failures
Another modeling issue that may be quite problem Finally, it is worth noting that, if uncertainty about combinatorial knowledge on components has to be modeled (either through noisy gates simplifications or through complete CPT specifications), the FTA notion of MCS does no longer make sense. In this case, the computation of diagnoses intended as composite be liefs on primary events as shown in section 4, provides a natural counterpart of the MCS concept.
Conclusions
In the present paper we have discussed the suitability shown the importance of all the above mentioned im provements.
